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OPINION
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CHAGARES, Circuit Judge.
Plaintiff Delta Airlines, Inc. (“Delta”) appeals from the
District Court’s dismissal of this declaratory judgment action on
forum non conveniens grounds.  Defendant Chimet, S.p.A.
(“Chimet”) shipped approximately 100 kilograms of pure platinum
with Delta from Milan, Italy to Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.  The
shipment of platinum arrived in Philadelphia but was reported
stolen before reaching its ultimate destination.  Delta filed a
complaint in the District Court, seeking a declaration that its
liability for this loss was limited pursuant to Article 22(3) of the
Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules for International
Carriage by Air, done at Montreal on May 28, 1999 (the “Montreal
Convention” or the “Convention”).  The District Court granted
Chimet’s motion to dismiss the action on forum non conveniens
grounds, concluding that critical documents, witnesses, and third
parties relevant to the dispute would only be available in Italy and
that the location of the alleged culpable conduct was in Italy.  For
the reasons that follow, we will affirm.
3I.
Chimet is an Italian company without any “offices, property,
or representatives in the United States of America.”  Appendix
(“App.”) 131.  On April 21, 2007, Chimet hired Delta to carry
cargo consisting of over 100 kilograms of pure platinum from Italy
to Philadelphia, Pennsylvania for delivery to Johnson Matthey, Inc.
(“Johnson Matthey”).  Chimet worked with several Italian
intermediaries to perform the shipment.  Chimet appointed
Arexpress to arrange for the transportation of the platinum to
Johnson Matthey.  App. 115.  Arexpress retained Securpol
Vigilantes to pick up the platinum from Chimet’s factory.  App.
116.  Securpol Vigilantes delivered the platinum to Vicenza Sped,
which transported the platinum from Vicenza, Italy to Malpensa
Airport in Milan.  Id.  At the airport, Vicenza consigned the
platinum to Delta’s agent, Malpensa Logistica Europea S.p.A.  Id.
 Delta then transported the platinum to Philadelphia, via Atlanta,
Georgia.  Before the platinum was delivered to Johnson Matthey,
however, it was reported stolen.
The Montreal Convention, which governs the international
carriage of passengers, baggage, and cargo, limits Delta’s liability
for the loss of cargo to a specified amount per kilogram – an
amount much lower than the actual value of the platinum in this
case – unless Chimet declared a higher value when it consigned the
goods.  The parties dispute whether Chimet declared a higher
value.
Much of the dispute focuses on the meaning of two
documents that were generated in connection with the shipment:
an air waybill, printed on a standard International Air
Transporation Association (IATA) form, App. 96-97, and a
document known as a distinta consegna merce, which we will refer
to as a delivery receipt, App. 94.  The waybill form includes fields
that appear to be designed to allow the consignor to designate
values for the cargo.  In the field labeled as “Declared Value for
 The same letters are listed in the field labeled “Declared1
Value for Customs.”  App. 96.  In addition, the entry “N.I.L.” is
listed in the field labeled “Amount of Insurance.”  Id. 
 According to Chimet, the value of the shipment exceeded2
$4 million.  Chimet Br. at 1.
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Carriage,” the waybill lists the letters “NVD.”  App. 96.   Delta1
claims that this abbreviation signifies “No Value Declared.”  App.
140.  Chimet disagrees with this interpretation, asserting that Italian
witnesses will need to testify at trial regarding the meaning of this
entry.  Chimet Br. at 21.
The waybill also includes several entries that appear to
detail the contents of the shipment.  In a field labeled “Nature and
Quantity of Goods (incl. Dimensions or Volume),” the waybill
includes an indication that the goods are “PURE PLATINUM.”
App. 96.   In the area under this description of the goods as pure
platinum, the following information is printed:
VAL VAL VAL VAL
THE FINAL TRANSPORTATION FROM THE
AIRPORT TO THE CONSIGNEE’S ADDRESS
MUST BE PERFORMED BY CUSTOMS
BROKERS OR SPECIALISED COURIERS TO
FORWARD VALUABLE CARGO
Id.  Chimet suggests that this entry “indicates [its] intent to declare
the valuable nature of the cargo.”  Chimet Br. at 21.  Indeed, the
delivery receipt, discussed in greater detail below, indicates a value
for the shipment of €3,050,000.   App. 94.  2
Delta claims that if Vicenza Sped had attempted to declare
a value for carriage of €3,050,000, it would not have accepted the
shipment because Delta’s tariff rules limit the value that can be
declared for a single shipment to $100,000.  App. 141.  Delta also
asserts that if Vicenza Sped had been able to declare this value, the
“valuation charge” would have been €22,885.52, or approximately
$30,000.00.  App. 140-41.  In addition, Delta contends that the
entry “VAL AP Fees 140.47 Euros” entered in the field labeled
5“Insurance Premium” could not represent a request for insurance
in the amount of €3,050,000.  App. 142-43.  Had there been such
a request, Delta maintains, “the premium would have been
$24,000.00, not $185.00,” the amount that appears on the waybill.
App. 143.  Delta interprets the entry that appears in the “Insurance
Premium” field as a spillover from the “Other Charges” field
directly above.  See id. (“The 140.47 Euro amount shown reflects
a portion of certain miscellaneous ‘other charges’ due carrier,
which total 218.52 Euros.  These other charges were a 5.31 Euros
‘airport tax’; a fuel surcharge of 72.27 Euros and a valuable
handling charge made by the export warehouse in Milan of 140.47
Euros.”).
The reverse side of the waybill form includes a number of
legal notices.  App. 97.  At the top of the page, a capitalized notice
states that under the Warsaw Convention (which preceded the
Montreal Convention), the carrier’s liability is limited in the case
of loss unless a higher value is declared in advance and a
supplementary charge paid if required.  Id.  In addition, under the
heading “CONDITIONS OF CONTRACT,” the following
provisions are listed:
4.  Except as otherwise provided in carrier’s
tariffs or conditions of carriage, in carriage to
which the Warsaw Convention does not
apply, carrier’s liability shall not exceed USD
20.00 or the equivalent per kilogram of goods
lost . . . .
5. If the sum entered on the face of the air
waybill as “Declared Value for Carriage”
represents an amount in excess of the
applicable limits of liability referred to in the
above Notice and in these Conditions and if
the shipper has paid any supplementary
charge that may be required by the carrier’s
tariffs, conditions of carriage or regulations,
this shall constitute a special declaration of
value and in this case carrier’s limitation of
liability shall be the sum so declared.  
6Id.  
The parties also dispute the significance of the delivery
receipt, a one-page document printed primarily in Italian on a
Vicenza Sped form.  App. 94.  The delivery receipt appears to list
the number of the air waybill, 006 4899 1622, the weight of the
cargo, the destination, and the carrier.  Id.  It also includes an entry
containing the following figure:  “EU 3.050.000,00.”  Id.  Chimet
interprets this entry as a declaration of value.  See App. 116 (“Delta
received a delivery receipt from Vicenza Sped for the Platinum that
listed the value of the Platinum as €3,050,000.00.”).  Delta
contends that the delivery receipt “only confirms that the shipment
was delivered to Delta’s agent.”  App. 142.  According to Delta,
the delivery receipt “is not a transportation document and does not
indicate a request for a declared value for carriage.”  Id.
Chimet “denies that it did not make a declaration of value
and did not pay the relative surcharge since the delivery receipt,
which was received by Delta, lists the value of the Platinum as
€3,050,000.00 and the air waybill shows that additional
transportation costs were paid.”  App. 118.  Chimet claims that
testimony from individuals at Arexpress, Securpol, and Vicenza
Sped would confirm its interpretation of the waybill and delivery
receipt and provide additional information regarding the
instructions for shipping the platinum and the creation of the
documents.  Id.  Chimet represents that all of these individuals are
citizens and residents of Italy, without any contacts with the United
States, and that their testimony can therefore only be obtained in
Italy.  App. 119.
Delta initiated this declaratory judgment action by filing a
complaint in the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania on July 13, 2007.  By order dated
December 19, 2008, the District Court granted Chimet’s motion to
dismiss on forum non conveniens grounds.  App. 4.  The District
Court began its analysis by determining that Italy presented an
adequate alternative forum.  App. 10.  The court concluded that
since Delta had filed the action in its home forum, the United
States, this choice of forum would be accorded “considerable
deference.”  App. 11.  With this deference in mind, the District
7Court applied the factors set forth by the Supreme Court in Gulf
Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501 (1947).  The District Court
determined that since a number of important witnesses might only
be available if the trial were held in Italy, some of the relevant
documents were located in Italy and written in Italian, and several
third parties could only be joined in Italy, the “private interest
factors” weighed in favor of granting the motion.  See App. 31-33.
Applying the “public interest factors,” the District Court concluded
that although the “administrative difficulties flowing from court
congestion is a neutral factor,” the “locus of the alleged culpable
conduct is Italy,” and “the local interest in having localized
controversies decided at home favors dismissal of this action.”
App. 34.  The District Court therefore concluded, inter alia, that “a
trial in the United States would be oppressive and vexatious to
Chimet out of all proportion to the convenience of Delta” and that
the action should be dismissed.  App. 34.  Delta timely appealed.
II.
The District Court had jurisdiction over this action arising
under the Montreal Convention pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and
we have jurisdiction over the final judgment dismissing the action
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We review a dismissal on forum non
conveniens grounds for abuse of discretion.  Windt v. Qwest
Commc’ns Int’l, Inc., 529 F.3d 183, 189 (3d Cir. 2008).  “[T]he
district court is accorded substantial flexibility in evaluating a
forum non conveniens motion, and ‘[e]ach case turns on its facts.’”
Van Cauwenberghe v. Biard, 486 U.S. 517, 529 (1988) (quoting
Williams v. Green Bay & W. R.R. Co., 326 U.S. 549, 557 (1946)
(citation omitted)).  A district court’s decision to dismiss for forum
non conveniens “may be reversed only when there has been a clear
abuse of discretion; where the court has considered all relevant
public and private interest factors, and where its balancing of these
factors is reasonable, its decision deserves substantial deference.”
Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 257 (1981).  A district
court abuses its discretion only “when it fails to consider
adequately and to determine the amount of deference due the
foreign plaintiff’s choice of forum or when it clearly errs in
weighing the factors to be considered.”  Lony v. E.I. Du Pont de
Nemours & Co., 886 F.2d 628, 632 (3d Cir. 1989).
8III.
The Supreme Court has directed that “a plaintiff’s choice of
forum should rarely be disturbed.”  Piper Aircraft, 454 U.S. at 241.
However, a district court may dismiss an action based on forum
non conveniens if “an alternative forum has jurisdiction to hear the
case,” and trial in the plaintiff’s chosen forum “would ‘establish .
. . oppressiveness and vexation to a defendant . . . out of all
proportion to plaintiff’s convenience,’” or the “‘chosen forum [is]
inappropriate because of considerations affecting the court’s own
administrative and legal problems’ . . . .”  Id. (quoting Koster v.
Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 330 U.S. 518, 524 (1947)).
Although “the decision to grant or deny a forum non
conveniens motion lies within the district court’s sound discretion,”
the court’s decision “‘should be an exercise in structured discretion
founded on a procedural framework guiding the district court’s
decision making process.’”  Lacey v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 862 F.2d
38, 43 (3d Cir. 1988) (quoting In re Air Crash Disaster Near New
Orleans, La. on July 9, 1982, 821 F.2d 1147, 1165 (5th Cir. 1987)).
The court must first decide whether an adequate alternative forum
exists to hear the case.  Lony, 886 F.2d at 633 (citing Lacey, 862
F.2d at 43).  The court must then evaluate the amount of deference
due to the plaintiff’s choice of forum.  Id.  Finally, the court must
“consider and balance” the private and public interest factors set
forth in Gilbert.  Id.  The list of Gilbert factors to be balanced “is
by no means exhaustive, and some factors may not be relevant in
the context of a particular case.”  Van Cauwenberghe, 486 U.S. at
528-29.  The defendant bears the burden of persuasion at each
stage in the analysis, and a district court abuses its discretion if it
fails to hold the defendant to its burden.  Lacey, 862 F.2d at 43.
Delta does not contest the adequacy of the alternative forum.
However, Delta argues that the District Court abused its discretion
by according insufficient deference to Delta’s choice of forum and
in its application of the Gilbert factors.
A.
Delta first argues that the District Court abused its discretion
9through the level of deference it applied to Delta’s choice of forum.
“Ordinarily, a strong presumption of convenience exists in favor of
a domestic plaintiff’s chosen forum, and this presumption may be
overcome only when the balance of the public and private factors
clearly favors an alternate forum.”  Windt, 529 F.3d at 190 (citing
Piper Aircraft, 454 U.S. at 255).  Consistent with this established
precedent, the District Court concluded that Delta’s choice of
forum should be afforded “considerable deference.”  App. 27.  
Delta suggests that despite the District Court’s unambiguous
statement regarding the level of deference, “no deference was
apparent from the reasoning stated” in the District Court’s opinion.
Delta Br. at 12.  Delta argues that the District Court erred by
“merely restat[ing] the rules pertaining to deference, a tactic which
does not satisfy the District Court’s obligation to address
deference.”  Id.  Indeed, in Lony, we held that the District Court
abused its discretion by failing to explain how much deference
should be given the plaintiff’s choice of forum, instead merely
“restating the rule and filling in the names of the parties.”  886 F.2d
at 634.
Unlike in Lony, the District Court in this case did evaluate
Chimet’s arguments that Delta’s choice of forum deserved no
deference, disagreed with this position, and then noted explicitly
that it granted “considerable deference” to Delta’s choice of forum.
App. 27.  Given this statement, Delta’s only possible argument is
that the District Court did not actually apply the level of deference
that it stated it was applying.  Delta obviously disagrees with the
District Court’s ultimate determination that the case should be
dismissed, but this does not establish that the District Court failed
to apply the proper level of deference.  Delta’s forum choice
“should not be given dispositive weight.”  Piper Aircraft, 454 U.S.
at 255 n.23.  Although citizens “deserve somewhat more deference
than foreign plaintiffs, . . . dismissal should not be automatically
barred when a plaintiff has filed suit in his home forum.”  Id.  “As
always, if the balance of conveniences suggests that trial in the
chosen forum would be unnecessarily burdensome for the
defendant or the court, dismissal is proper.”  Id.  
The District Court explained that it had granted Delta’s
10
choice of forum considerable deference but that the balance of
conveniences nonetheless warranted dismissal.  Other than its own
ipse dixit, Delta has nothing to substantiate its suspicions that the
District Court was merely paying lip service to the governing
standard.  We conclude that the District Court did not abuse its
discretion in determining the level of deference to be accorded to
Delta’s choice of forum.
B.
Delta’s second argument is that the District Court erred in
its application of the Gilbert factors.  In Gilbert, the Supreme Court
“provided a list of ‘private interest factors’ affecting the
convenience of the litigants, and a list of ‘public interest factors’
affecting the convenience of the forum.”  Piper Aircraft, 454 U.S.
at 241 (quoting Gilbert, 330 U.S. at 508-09).   The private interest
factors affecting the convenience of the litigants include:
the relative ease of access to sources of proof;
availability of compulsory process for attendance of
unwilling, and the cost of obtaining attendance of
willing, witnesses; possibility of view of premises, if
view would be appropriate to the action; and all
other practical problems that make trial of a case
easy, expeditious and inexpensive.  
Gilbert, 330 U.S. at 508; see Piper Aircraft, 454 U.S. at 241 n.6.
The public interest factors affecting the convenience of the forum
include:
the administrative difficulties flowing from court
congestion; the “local interest in having localized
controversies decided at home”; the interest in
having the trial of a diversity case in a forum that is
at home with the law that must govern the action; the
avoidance of unnecessary problems in conflict of
laws, or in the application of foreign law; and the
unfairness of burdening citizens in an unrelated
forum with jury duty.
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Piper Aircraft, 454 U.S. at 241 n.6 (quoting Gilbert, 330 U.S. at
509).  Delta argues that the District Court erred in its application of
both sets of factors.
1.
We begin by analyzing the private interest factors that
supported the District Court’s conclusion that Italy would be a
significantly more convenient forum for the litigants.  The District
Court concluded that “[a]ll of the evidence regarding the
communications between Chimet and Delta, the meaning of the
term ‘VAL VAL VAL VAL,’ and whatever documentary evidence
exists outside of the air waybill and delivery receipt is in Italy.”
App. 31-32.  The court also noted that Chimet would need to
depose third-party witnesses who reside in Italy, speak only Italian,
and are beyond the scope of the Court’s subpoena power.  App. 32.
The court further reasoned that “all of the documentary evidence,
other than the waybill and receipt, memorializing the involvement
of Chimet, Arexpress, Securpol Vigilantes, Vicenza Sped, and
Malpensa Logistica Europea S.p.A. is located in Italy and will be
in Italian.”  App. 32-33.  The District Court therefore concluded
that these private interest factors supported dismissal.
Delta counters that none of the evidence cited by the District
Court is actually necessary to adjudicate the dispute.  It contends
that the dispute can be resolved by applying the Montreal
Convention’s liability provisions to a single contractual document:
the air waybill.  Delta therefore argues that the District Court’s
analysis was based on the faulty premise that additional evidence
would need to be gathered in Italy.  We have explained that for the
ease of access to evidence to enter the Gilbert analysis, the
evidence in question must actually be relevant to resolving the
dispute:
In examining the relative ease of access to sources of
proof, and the availability of witnesses, the district
court must scrutinize the “substance of the dispute
between the parties to evaluate what proof is
required, and determine whether the pieces of
evidence cited by the parties are critical, or even
12
relevant to, the plaintiff’s cause of action and to any
potential defenses to the action.”
Lacey, 862 F.2d at 46 (quoting  Van Cauwenberghe, 486 U.S. at
528); accord Lony, 886 F.2d at 635-36.  If resolution of Delta’s
claim under the Montreal Convention did not require looking
beyond the air waybill, as Delta argues, then the District Court
should not have considered Chimet’s asserted need to gather
additional evidence in Italy.  We must examine how the
transactional documents in the record fit within the contractual
scheme created by the Montreal Convention to evaluate Delta’s
argument.
“When interpreting a treaty, we begin with the text of the
treaty and the context in which the written words are used.”
Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Schlunk, 486 U.S. 694, 699
(1988) (quotation marks omitted).  The Montreal Convention limits
the carrier’s liability for loss of cargo, unless the consignor declares
a higher value:
In the carriage of cargo, the liability of the carrier in
the case of destruction, loss, damage or delay is
limited to a sum of 17 Special Drawing Rights per
kilogramme, unless the consignor has made, at the
time when the package was handed over to the
carrier, a special declaration of interest in delivery at
destination and has paid a supplementary sum if the
case so requires.  In that case the carrier will be
liable to pay a sum not exceeding the declared sum
. . . .
Art. 22(3).  The Convention does not specify how this “special
declaration of interest” is to be documented, but it does require the
delivery of a document, typically an air waybill, to preserve the
record of carriage.  See Art. 4(1) (“In respect of the carriage of
cargo, an air waybill shall be delivered.”); Art. 4(2) (“Any other
means which preserves a record of the carriage to be performed
may be substituted for the delivery of an air waybill.”).  If a
document other than a waybill is used to preserve the record of
carriage, “the carrier shall, if so requested by the consignor, deliver
13
to the consignor a cargo receipt permitting identification of the
consignment and access to the information contained in the record
preserved by such other means.”  Art. 4(2).  The Convention
specifies certain information that must be included in the air
waybill or cargo receipt, including “an indication of the places of
departure and destination,” and “an indication of the weight of the
consignment.”  Art. 5.  The consignor is responsible for the
accuracy of the information in the air waybill or cargo receipt, Art.
10(1), even if the carrier “makes out the air waybill . . . on behalf
of the consignor,” Art. 7(4).  Accordingly, “[t]he consignor shall
indemnify the carrier against all damage suffered by it, or by any
other person to whom the carrier is liable, by reason of the
irregularity, incorrectness or incompleteness” of the information
“furnished by the consignor or on its behalf.”  Art. 10(2).  The
Convention also provides that “[t]he air waybill or the cargo receipt
is prima facie evidence of the conclusion of the contract, of the
acceptance of the cargo, and of the conditions of carriage
mentioned therein.”  Art. 11(1).
Delta argues that under these Montreal Convention
provisions, this case can be decided solely by reference to the air
waybill.  As set forth above, the Convention designates the air
waybill or cargo receipt as the primary mechanisms for recording
the conditions of carriage.  The Convention also provides that the
consignor is responsible for creating the air waybill, see Art. 7(1)
(“The air waybill shall be made out by the consignor . . . .”), for the
accuracy of the air waybill, and for any damages caused by
inaccuracies in the air waybill.  Art. 10.  Based on these provisions,
Delta argues that Chimet failed to fulfill its responsibility to declare
“a special declaration of interest” under Article 22(3).  
We agree that Chimet failed to document in the waybill that
it made a special declaration of interest or paid a supplemental
sum.  The waybill does not include any explicit reference to a
declared value, and Chimet was responsible for completing the
waybill and verifying its accuracy.  We also agree with Delta’s
general contention that an air waybill typically functions as the
primary mechanism for documenting the terms of carriage.  We
disagree, however, that this dispute can be conclusively resolved
solely by examining the air waybill.
 The “cargo receipt” is a document prepared by the carrier3
at the request of the consignor.  Art. 4(2).  The delivery receipt was
prepared by Vicenza Sped, not Delta.  App. 94.  Moreover, the
delivery receipt does not appear to include the information required
under Article 5 of the Convention.
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As the District Court recognized, the air waybill includes
conflicting and inconsistent information.  The air waybill describes
the goods as “PURE PLATINUM” and includes the following
entry:
VAL VAL VAL VAL
THE FINAL TRANSPORTATION FROM THE
AIRPORT TO THE CONSIGNEE’S ADDRESS
MUST BE PERFORMED BY CUSTOMS
BROKERS OR SPECIALISED COURIERS TO
FORWARD VALUABLE CARGO
App. 96.  Although the meaning of the “VAL VAL VAL VAL” is
not clear, the reference to valuable cargo supports Chimet’s
contention that it declared a higher value for the shipment.  Chimet
has also produced an affidavit stating that the “air waybill shows
that additional transportation costs were paid.”  App. 118. 
The delivery receipt constitutes documentary evidence that
Chimet may have declared a value of €3,050,000.00 for the
shipment.  Chimet asserts that when Delta received the shipment,
it also “received a delivery receipt from Vicenza Sped for the
Platinum that listed the value of the Platinum as €3,050,000.00.”
App. 116.  The delivery receipt, although somewhat difficult to
interpret, includes an entry that corroborates this value.  See App.
94 (listing “EU 3.050.000,00”).  Although we disagree with
Chimet’s suggestion that the delivery receipt functions as a “cargo
receipt” providing “prima facie evidence” of the declared value
under Article 11 of the Convention, see Chimet Br. at 19,  we3
conclude that the documentary evidence in the record does not
conclusively resolve the dispute. 
Nothing in the Montreal Convention precludes the
 The provision in Article 4(2) stating that “[i]f such other4
means are used, the carrier shall, if so requested by the consignor,
deliver to the consignor a cargo a receipt permitting identification
of the consignment and access to the information contained in the
record preserved by such other means” does not rule out the
possibility that another method for preserving the record of
carriage, other than a waybill or cargo receipt, may have been used.
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consideration of extrinsic evidence to determine the terms of the
contract of carriage.  On the contrary, the Convention includes
language suggesting that other evidence beyond the air waybill may
be considered.  While the Convention designates the air waybill as
the default method for preserving a “record of the carriage,” it also
contemplates the possibility that “[a]ny other means” may be used
to preserve such a record.  Art. 4(2); see also Art. 10(1) (referring
to the “record preserved by the other means referred to in
paragraph 2 of Article 4”); Art. 10(3) (same).    In addition, Article4
11 provides merely that the “the air waybill or the cargo receipt is
prima facie evidence of the conclusion of the contract, of the
acceptance of the cargo, and of the conditions of carriage
mentioned therein.”  Art. 11(1).  This word choice – as contrasted
with more explicit options such as “conclusive” or “complete” –
clearly contemplates the possibility that the air waybill or cargo
receipt may be rebutted by other evidence.  See Black’s Law
Dictionary (8th ed. 2004) (defining prima facie evidence as
“[e]vidence that will establish a fact or sustain a judgment unless
contradictory evidence is produced” (emphasis added)).  The
delivery receipt provides at least some evidence to rebut Delta’s
position that no supplemental value was declared.  Given the
apparent tension between the waybill and the delivery receipt, as
well as potential inconsistencies within the waybill itself, the
District Court did not err by considering the parties’ ability to
gather additional evidence on this disputed issue.
Furthermore, Chimet met its burden of demonstrating that
this evidence may only be obtained in Italy.  Chimet produced an
affidavit attesting to the need to obtain testimony from a number of
Italian witnesses over whom United States courts lack subpoena
power:
16
To resolve the issue of whether Chimet made a
declaration of value for shipment and paid a
surcharge for it, Chimet will require the testimony of
at least Arexpress and Vicenza Sped and the
following individuals:  Mr. Manuele Nocenti of
Arexpress who arranged the operations pertaining to
the transportation and custom clearance of the
Platinium and gave instructions to Securpol and
Vicenza Sped; Mrs. Stefania Criscuolo and Lavinia
Damian of Vicenza Sped who [were] aware of the
conditions in which [the] air waybill and delivery
receipt were completed and provided to Delta; and
also Messrs. Mattteo Vencato and Corrado Vezzaro
who, on behalf of Vicenza Sped, physically
delivered the goods to the agent of Delta received
from this agent, as acknowledgment, the stamp
signature on the “merchandise delivery receipt”
mentioned above.
App. 118-19.  This affidavit was sufficient to meet Chimet’s
burden of persuasion on this point.  A party seeking to dismiss an
action on forum non conveniens grounds is not required “to
describe with specificity the evidence they would not be able to
obtain if trial were held in the United States.”  Piper Aircraft, 454
U.S. at 258.  The Supreme Court has rejected the suggestion that
“defendants seeking forum non conveniens dismissal must submit
affidavits identifying the witnesses they would call and the
testimony these would provide if the trial were held in the
alternative forum,” explaining that “[s]uch detail is not necessary.”
Id.  Rather, the defendant “must provide enough information to
enable the District Court to balance the parties’ interests.”  Id.  In
this case, Chimet identified the witnesses it intended to depose and
proffered in oral argument the information that it expected to
obtain.  Given these representations, the District Court did not
abuse its discretion in determining that access to evidence and the
availability of witnesses weighed in favor of dismissal.
Delta also challenges the District Court’s analysis regarding
Chimet’s stated intent to join third parties that it could not join if
the litigation were to go forward in the United States.  The District
17
Court considered “Chimet’s ability to join Arexpress, Securpol
Vigilantes, Vicenza Sped, and Malpensa Logistica Europea S.p.A.
in its litigation with Delta” as an additional private interest factor
supporting dismissal.  App. 33.  A defendant’s “stated desire to
pursue contribution claims against potentially responsible third
parties” is a relevant private interest factor.  Windt, 529 F.3d at
195.  Delta asserts that Chimet has not, in fact, pursued claims
against these third parties, and that the statute of limitations for
bringing a claim under the Montreal Convention has now lapsed.
See Delta Reply Br. at 5-6.  Given our direction that a defendant’s
“stated desire” to pursue claims against foreign third parties must
be considered among the private factors, Windt, 529 F.3d at 195
(emphasis added), Delta’s argument that Chimet has not followed
through on that stated desire does not warrant vacating the
judgment.  The District Court reasonably concluded that the private
interest factors weighed in favor of dismissing the action.
2.  
We turn next to the District Court’s consideration of the
public interest factors.  The District Court concluded that “the local
interest in having localized controversies decided at home favors
dismissal of this action” because the “locus of the alleged culpable
conduct is Italy.” App. 34 (citing Lacey, 862 F.2d at 48).  The court
also concluded that “the administrative difficulties flowing from
court congestion is a neutral factor” and that the courts in the two
countries are “equally qualified to interpret and enforce” the
Montreal Convention.  App. 34.
Delta argues that the District Court failed to give sufficient
weight to Pennsylvania’s interest in the dispute.  The factual issues
at the center of this dispute, however, all involve whether Chimet
declared the value of the shipment when it delivered the platinum
to Delta in Italy.  The circumstances under which the shipment of
cargo was lost in Pennsylvania are not relevant to determining
whether Delta’s liability is limited under the Montreal Convention.
“In evaluating the public interest factors the district court must
‘consider the locus of the alleged culpable conduct, often a
disputed issue, and the connection of that conduct to plaintiff’s
chosen forum.’”  Lacey, 862 F.2d at 42 (quoting Van
18
Cauwenberghe, 486 U.S. at 528).   We agree with the District
Court that the locus of the alleged culpable conduct was Italy, not
Pennsylvania.  The District Court therefore reasonably concluded
that the public interest factors also supported dismissal of the
action.
*     *     *     *
Insofar as both sets of Gilbert factors – the private interest
factors affecting the convenience of the litigants and the public
interest factors affecting the convenience of the forum – weighed
in favor of litigating this dispute in Italy, the District Court did not
abuse its discretion by granting Chimet’s motion to dismiss on
forum non conveniens grounds.
IV.
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of
the District Court.
